I made up this term, at least I think I made it up. I call it an argument from adequacy. It’s not a very good term, but I want some term and it’s all I can think of right now. I find arguments from adequacy annoying. Here’s what I mean by the term.
An argument from adequacy is an argument along the lines of “given X objective conditions, Y philosophical argument is now what we need and/or is now even more possible.” An argument from adequacy is about the relationship between ideas and their contexts.
I know I’ve run into other versions of this, but the only example that springs to mind is one like this, which I know I’ve run into as well. “Nowadays there is no place and no social location that is outside the power of state and capital. Therefore, arguments drawn from Spinoza are particularly useful to us, because Spinoza thinks of there being one substance, although with varying modes.” Now, I’m not against Spinoza or people drawing from Spinoza, I just offer this as an example - in this case I think it’s a bad argument for drawing on Spinoza. That doesn’t mean we shouldn’t draw on Spinoza, it just means this type of argument is not a good argument for why we should do so. I call this an argument from adequacy because there’s a claim to the particular adequacy of an idea or body of ideas to a particular moment or condition.
The move made in the “situation X makes idea Y make sense” argument with regard to Spinoza is particularly weird in that is proposes a structural homology between conditions and ideas - “there’s one social space, so we need a thought of being as one” or something. That (admittedly reductive) example aside, I want to point out something. To make the identification between situation X and idea Y implies another idea, Z, or at least some kind of framework and reasoning process. Because if the decision to use Y is based on criteria within Y then Y is basically a tautology. (I’m not necessarily averse to tautologies, but that’s another matter.) In that case, if the person one was trying to convince already accepted Y then there’d be little reason to resort to “situation X therefore idea Y” kinds of arguments, because the other person would already be convinced. But if we have idea or reasoning process Z which is capable of apprehending situation X to such a degree that we can make claims like “Y is especially suited to this” then why would we even need Y in the first place? At the very least, the reasoning process by which one argues on behalf of Y seems to suggest that we can get pretty far without Y. Otherwise, if there is no such robust reasoning process like Z then how can we trust the analysis with which the assessment of adequacy (that idea Y is particularly suited to condition X)?
To be clear, I do think we should test ideas based on their adequacy for our uses. But adequacy is not inherent in ideas alone. Adequacy is a matter of what we manage to make of ideas in contexts. That is, adequacy is something we determine after some attempts to make use of ideas. It’s not something we set out from. The real test is in the use (though all of this also implies other ideas with which to formulate and implement the test). That one version of an idea fails doesn’t mean all must. This is part of why I find Deleuze [or Althusser, or whomever] vs Hegel, or immanence vs transcendence, or affirmation vs negativity, etc etc, such an incredibly dull debate with regard to philosophy and marxism - the utility of these ideas in the work done with them, these ideas at best underdetermine what other work can be done with them. And as I said it’s the work done that is the test of adequacy. At the same time, work done is alone not a sufficient criterion of recommendation (I don’t think I believe in sufficiency of recommendation actually, at least not in a strong sense), as it’s always possible to do other work with other ideas.
I think in short this amounts to a restatement of the metaphilosophical minimalist position I was trying to argue for a bit before, at least within marxism, which may amount to little more than a level of skepticism about the possibility for giving strong reasons for adopting any particular theoretical position.
I should say, none of this is a criticism of common sense claims like “in the face of increased experiences with diversity we tend to want ideas better suited to getting along across differences and to have an easier time accepting such arguments.”
Comment by Nate — October 17, 2009 @ 5:12 pm
In this alter-universe you have set up, I will try to defend the “adequacy” argument, simply from a perspective of philosophical method.
Take the Spinoza/Negri connection for example. If we take the idea of “no outside to capitalism” as a hypothesis, which may be true or false, it is not always clear what the consequences this idea would be for a number of things, ethics, status of entities, interaction of forces etc. Now, the content of a hypothesis constrains our ability of refer to certain kinds of inferences. An immanentist position will limit our reference to transcendence, a materialist position will limit our reference to the causality of ideas. In the case of Negri, the philosophical appeal of Spinoza is obvious, because this is a thinker who lays down a model for an immanent conception of substance, God, universe, interaction of forces, etc. Since this is a far reaching model, the sorts of inferences that Spinoza makes would be key to understand the consequences of taking such a position, the way the system hangs together, etc.
So, a philosophical position adapted to a contemporary situation will need to draw from earlier models. This is the role of Spinoza. (I think).
Now, the idea that a situation makes a certain hypothesis more pertinent is of course subject to another form of argumentation, namely the strength of the analogy one would make. But, without first fleshing out the interior of the model, no such analogy has the chance of even be evaluated.
eh?
Comment by tzuchien — October 17, 2009 @ 6:25 pm
hey Tzuchien,
Nice to hear from you. Re: Spinoza and real subsumption, you point out an error I made. Clearly at some registers objective conditions do (should) impact our theories. I had in mind something a bit different, though. I was thinking w/r/t Spinoza that I don’t find an argument like “the structure of capital accumulation is different now, thus we need a different understanding of causality than we have used before” to be convincing. Trying to reconstruct my intuitions into sentences, I’d say that I’ve got a sort of vague principle of relative proximity of knowledge register when it comes to how convincing I find these sorts of claims. “Capital accumulation has changed, therefore we should re-examine our assumptions about financial markets” totally makes sense, because “financial markets” feels closer to “capital accumulation.” “Capital accumulation has changed, therefore we need to revise our notions of causality” doesn’t convince me in part because it seems to me that the nature of causality is a good deal removed from capital accumulation. And, because it seems to me that at least some other models of causality are likely to be compatible with producing knowledge about capital accumulation - one can agree about the analysis of accumulation and disagree on Spinoza vs Hegel, do you see what I mean?
All of that said I certainly agree that “a philosophical position adapted to a contemporary situation will need to draw from earlier models.” Absolutely. But that’s a matter of the utility of the history of philosophy in learning to think and as a set of procedures for thinking. I also think that the language of models is interesting here, as you say this is about analogies drawn. I suppose part of what I’m on about is that I see an argument from adequacy as in part obscuring the steps involved in positing an analogy, saying something like “there is some connection between this idea and that situation” rather than “we draw these connections, doing so seems helpful to us for the following reasons.” know what I’m saying? (Not “do you agree?” but rather “am I being at all clear?”)
cheers,
Nate
ps - We still need to schedule a phone call! i miss you.
Comment by Nate — October 17, 2009 @ 6:42 pm
Dearest Nate,
Yes, I see your point, and I’ve known you long enough to understand the various political and philosophical weight of these points. But, since your post posited a very stripped down evaluation (perhaps an attempt to crystallize a logical kernel) of this sort of move, I noticed a kind of lack of generosity. Of course, most of these sorts of arguments are made very badly and obfuscates the very thing that would allow these sorts of arguments to be interesting.
From a political perspective, I have no patience for these hegel/spinoza deadlocks, of course, I don’t run in those circles where these things even come up; wasted breath I tell ya. From a philosophical perspective though, there might be work to be done to produce a fully coherent theory of society where Spinoza is the key forebear. Nothing against these, as long as (like in mathematics) they show their work and close up those embarrassing gaps in argumentation.
love you too comrade. Would love to call. When would be good. Write me an email.
Comment by tzuchien — October 17, 2009 @ 6:53 pm
hey Tzuchien,
real quick -
re: a fully coherent theory of society where Spinoza’s the forbear, I agree. I’m probly more interested in the Spinozist versions of all this than the Hegelian ones, despite my grumpy lack of charity in this post. There’s still an issue of criteria of/grounds for recommendability, though. It’s logically possible that Spinoza’d be useful for producing a good theory of society (or the best one) according to some set of criteria. At least some (less grumpy, more charitable) days I’d even say it’s likely. But even with the best possible imaginable theory of society, there’s still an issue of recommendability and I’m suspicious of any version of an argument from adequacy. This may be failure of imagination on my part, but my intuition is to say that any argument from adequacy that had force would get its force from a lurking pragmatist type argument - this works for us, according to our criteria. I suppose that’s another of the issues I’m trying to sort out here - the difference between being convinced of a position and the criteria for being convinced or framework within which one is convinced. I’m not sure but I think what I’m on about with the term ‘argument from adequacy’ is attempts to get people to change their criteria at the same time getting them to use the new criteria to accept some position.
I’ll have to think more about all this. And try to find more examples (I know I’ve seen them other than Spinoza etc, I just can’t remember them right now).
re: a phone call, I’ll write you soon. My battery’s dead just now or I’d say call now!
xox
n8
ps - all my best to A.
Comment by Nate — October 17, 2009 @ 7:04 pm
hi nate - is this my first time commenting here? seems odd (i read you a lot) but there it is.
“these ideas at best underdetermine what other work can be done with them. And as I said it’s the work done that is the test of adequacy. At the same time, work done is alone not a sufficient criterion of recommendation (I don’t think I believe in sufficiency of recommendation actually, at least not in a strong sense), as it’s always possible to do other work with other ideas.”
i’m on board with your minimalist tendencies, but it seems like they could be more strongly put. all the philosophical concepts you list (with the possible exception of deleuze) have been used numerous times in the past, in numerous different ways. surely by now one can identify political tendencies among althusserians, dialecticians, whomever, and how these ideas informed their positions. or at least one could test this hypothesis. my unscientific guess based on my limited experience is that theoretical commitments (assuming one can tell commitment apart from opportunistic appropriation - difficult sometimes but i think one can) correlate with political position in complex ways, and can’t be strictly relativized. the range is not unlimited. Y in some sense IS Z, or Y wouldn’t be defended as vehemently as we know many do. there are situations where the invocation of Y reveals a poor understanding of X. for this reason i think a minimalism is obligated to defend itself against hegelianism, for example, not on principle of course, but in situations where it’s being deployed. this includes where it’s being deployed by marx himself - i think it would be helpful to go through capital sometime and pick out the moments where marx’s hegelianism can’t be dispensed with while still keeping the ideas (i.e. the progressivism in his theory of history), trace those arguments through the history of marxist criticism, etc.
Comment by traxus4420 — October 18, 2009 @ 5:38 pm
hi Traxus,
— About whether or not certain arguments make sense to me or not aside from political matters.
Thanks for your comment. It’s not your first but is no less welcome for it.
About the correlation between theoretical and political positions, yeah absolutely related, I think I’m jumbled here. On the one hand, clearly ideas and other practices relate! We can identify correlations between anti-racist and feminist movements and a production of ideas that take racism and gender hierarchy as a problem, for example. (Obvious and trivially true I bet.) From your response and from Tzuchien’s above I can’t tell how clear I was at all in the post - I wasn’t thinking about politics much at all when I wrote this post, I was mostly thinking about ideas in abstraction.
That said, about the political/theoretical correlation I think one issue I’m trying to get clear on which is related to this post but wasn’t at the forefront of my mind when I was writing it is that I don’t think ideas carry their political contents directly. That’s probably obvious too. What I mean is that the tie between political and theoretical positions is historical and contingent and is not mainly or primarily determined by the content of the theory, the relationships are more contextual and as you suggested variable. I suppose then what I’d say is that, to use your terms, “the range is not unlimited” in actual practice and as such we’re not making any mistake when we try to predict or correlate political positions with theoretical ones, but I want to say that the political content is not given by the ideas alone (I’m repeating myself, sorry, quite tired) and that at the level of the ideas in abstraction the ideas are compatible with a broader range of positions than their most frequent instantiations (so I might want to say that the range is at least quite broad when we’re talking about the ideas in abstraction).
I’m thinking in part here about Eagleton’s reply to Jameson - Jameson says “always historicize” and Eagleton says basically “always? really? does that include historicizing the impulse/injunction to historicize?” To my mind, to be consistent, I can’t claim any a-contextual political value to my insistence on contextualization. My hunch is (despite the contradiction) that contextualization is always most likely to be the best intellectual move, but not the best political move. I’d want to say something similar w/r/t my claims about (starter arguments for) theoretically minimalist marxism - I’m not sure there’s a political content to this, certainly not one which is there in all contexts. Know what I mean?
Sorry if this isn’t clear, like I said I’m quite tired.
cheers,
Nate
Comment by Nate — October 18, 2009 @ 8:26 pm