It’s been a little while since I’ve engaged much with Negri’s recent work or other post-operaismo material. Given how phenomenally important all of that was to me, it’s been a really long time, relatively speaking. I just stumbled across a translation of Negri’s response to Macherey’s criticisms of his recent work, an excerpt from which is pasted below.
I believe that critical thought, yesterday as today, still consists of placing the exploitation of labor power at the center of our theoretical framework. From this point of view, I reaffirm my fidelity to the critical mission of materialism. In reality, the new face of productive labor (intellectual, relational, linguistic, and affective, rather than physical, individual, muscular, instrumental) does not understate but accentuates the corporality and materiality of labor. It is clear that this transformation must always be considered in relative terms: in terms, however, that tend towards the real. We offer neither apology nor enthusiasm for this transformation of labor: who would argue that the fatigue of a call center operator is less (albeit absolutely different) than that of a steel worker of a century ago? Who would argue that the nurse working in a computerized hospital asks less of her body than did a coal miner? From another point of view, there are surely elements that aggravate the exploitation of “immaterial” labor (this term is not completely satisfying but it is the best that I know for marking this paradigm shift): the post-modern dissolution of space and labor time (the “work day” dissolves with increasing flexibility, the “factory” with increasing mobility), and the disappearance of temporal criteria for measuring labor (the classical law of labor value no longer holds as a measure of exploitation and, therefore, no longer provides the basis for a politico-syndical relation of force). A series of paradoxes follow from this point. For example, the laborer feels alone despite working in a cooperative and relational network: the multitude produces solitude. Or, inversely: the productive capacity of cognitive labor always exceeds the time spent in general at work (because intellectual labor cannot be reduced to simple intervals of time, and because the means of production do not lose but gain value during the labor process). Faced with these paradoxes, exploitation appears, in a manner more violent than ever, as the expropriation of the excesses created by intellectual labor, by cooperation itself.
If the classical descriptions of the “work day” and the law of value/labor no longer correspond to reality; if, moreover, we accept that labor remains at the center of production and constitutes the motor of all productivity, then we must also realize that we are now entering a new historical epoch, a new age of exploitation.
Massimiliano Tomba’s essay in the last issue of the Commoner is good and relevant on the periodization here. I’ve written many a blog post and the occasional paper on the topic too. It simply is not the case that there is a transition which has occurred like that which Negri describes. There certainly have been important changes in capitalism (though there are important continuities as well which I think Negri understates) but Negri’s periodization strikes me as at best a clumsy took for grasping this - like trying to catch a ball while wearing oven mits or with grease on one’s hands.
It’s not at all clear that “the classical descriptions of the “work day” and the law of value/labor no longer correspond to reality” though Negri is convinced it is. His conditional is rhetorical, not sincere - there is no question “if” the transition has happened. It has for Negri. Interestingly and I think revealingly, Negri has asserted the supercession of the law value since at least the late 1970s, well before his post-structural vocabulary and his attention to the affective and immaterial. It seems to me the case that his resort to that vocabulary and that attention is at least as much the result or expression of (that is, it’s motivated by a desire to retain) his views on the law of value as it is the case that this vocabulary and attention support his arguments about value.
To say that “exploitation appears, in a manner more violent than ever, as the expropriation of the excesses created by (…) cooperation itself” in the present neglects that capitalist exploitation was always the exploitation of cooperation (as detailed in the chapter on cooperation in v1 of Capital) in the workplace. Negri has written that today the workers no longer need the capitalist to provide the framework for cooperation, something which is a) in one sense true for some particular industries but false for others, b) in that same sense has long been true for many industries, and c) in another sense not only false but perniciously so, in that for Negri this means that the working class acquired a new or newly increased capacity for the autonomous production of social relations: the working class has always had this capacity, though it has been expressed in a variety of modes changing historically and geographically and by social strata. Negri’s new or newly increased capacity for cooperation in the present is a theoretical fiction deriving from an equally fictional minimizing of said capacities as they have existed in the past. This claim is problematic in a third sense as well: not only is cooperation present in production, but in reproduction as well. The commodity labor power enters the marketplace already the product of past and implicated in present cooperation outside the formally recognized workday. Negri’s lack of attention to this form of cooperation and its productivity is a failure to take reproductive labor and at least a certain type of feminism seriously enough.
As a result, each of these statements or their implications are overstated:
“the nurse working in a computerized hospital asks [as much] of her body than did a coal miner” - this is true, but not only of nurses in informationalized labor, and true of other and older reproductive labors. Also, coal miners are not a group who only “did” but also a group who “do”, which is to say, coal miners exist and are not a temporal throwback.
“the “work day” dissolves” - for reproductive labor it could be argued that the work day was always already dissolved, flexibilized, etc. At one point I beleive in the 90s (I can chase up the reference if anyone cares), Negri referred to the transition he believes he sees as the “becoming woman of labor,” somewhat akin to what Mies has called the housewife-ization of labor. This transition may be happening and is an important matter, but one can not adequately assess transition if one starts with an impoverished few of the past out of or from which we are allegedly transitioning.
“the disappearance of temporal criteria for measuring labor” - ditto. For both, it’s also arguable that the work day was and still is measurable and measured and solid (or whatever the opposite of “dissolved” is).
“the classical law of labor value no longer holds as a measure of exploitation and, therefore, no longer provides the basis for a politico-syndical relation of force” - again ditto. I don’t think Negri’s right about the law of value and even if he is then he gets that particular transition wrong. It’s also indicative that the story about “politico-syndical relations of force” is one of supercession - a “no longer” - rather than one of critique. Those once left out of that organizational form (in some parts of the world, anyway) are newly subjects in the present because of the present changed form of labor, according to Negri’s argument. This implies that these forms were once adequate and those excluded were once not subjects.
“the laborer feels alone despite working in a cooperative and relational network” - this also can apply to housework and traditional “women’s work.”
“the productive capacity of cognitive labor always exceeds the time spent in general at work” - this is true of all labor as I understand the claim. Even bad old Marxism saw a productive excess in waged labor: it was believed to discipline the working class, unite them, train and organize them to become capital’s grave diggers. The argument I mention above about reproductive labor also entails a view that the productive capacities used in reproducing labor power could be used to produce other forms of life, the same view holds for the critique of capitalist productive.
A friend of mine recently suggested that Negri and Hardt’s work may have something in common with post-feminism. I’m not familiar with anything like that. My reaction is summed up in the t-shirt slogan: “I’ll be post-feminist in the post-patriarchy.” That remark, though, makes me interested for the first time in trying to get to know that literature. Not any time soon, I’m still trying to get up to speed on feminist political economy and history (I will say the minimal degree to which I feel more up to speed on that makes me exponentially more confident about Negri being wrong about this stuff), but that seems a relevant line of inquiry eventually, though one which will probably be pretty annoying. It also seems to me that this may provide a fruitful avenue for reconsidering Negri’s early work on the law of value, which seems to be one of the constitutive axes of his work for the duration of his career at least since 1980.
not really related, but a reminder - read this later:
http://libcom.org/library/gay-communism-mario-mieli
Comment by Nate — October 22, 2007 @ 3:00 pm
Interesting post, Nate. Losurdo has had some harsh things to say about Negri too, addressing different issues than Macherey addressed. But it’s curious that Negri does not defend the text he wrote with Hardt, which was the object of PM’s criticism, but instead sort of clarifies his own thinking, which is a little different than his collaborations with Hardt. (Maybe Hardt is really the one inserting the apologies for US imperialism and the historical revisionism on political history that Losurdo faults the texts for.)
But, all this then. Why do you think he takes these position? Where is it coming from do you think? What would give him the impression of living in a new epoch, with this significant break? This is a hugely popular view but we can’t attribute its currency to Negri alone. Most of the promoters of the basic picture he paints declare allegiance to the opposite political camp.
A lot of the things Negri emphasises, and designates to be new, to be postwar things, seem to be basically reiterations of and elaborations on observations made by 18th century writers and also by Marx of 1844 writing about humanity, how a person is a social product, the product of human labour, how capital alienates all of human life and society, as in Private Property and Communism. (”This material, immediately perceptible private property is the material perceptible expression of estranged human life.“) To connect this to the thread lower down, this is kind of one of the places where the distinction between the materialist and idealist traditions of text product it very useful indeed, because what you see as Negri’s error couldn’t be made in the materialist tradition, because its given that human mental as well as physical capacities are produced by socially organised labour. Negri’s position seems to be saying that human consciousness and the special capacities of human beings as opposed to oxen or rivers was irrelevant to value production prior to a certain technological stage, but if this were the case for Marxism than weather would be classed by Marx as proletarian. His remark about the coal miner seems to be less about acknowledging the physical stresses of nursing in a technologically developed hospital than about denying the intellectual demands of coal mining. He seems to be sort of putting the coal miner in there as a kind of beast of burden, is just musclepower or a kind of horsepower in the right shape, to contrast to a kind of image of “the new working class”, sort of the way the image on the wheaties box gets updated.
Comment by chabert — October 22, 2007 @ 5:30 pm
He really avoided the main criticsm:
Okay, we are in the age of Empire which, according to Hardt and Negri, coincides with the moment of postmodernity, succeeding the moment of modernity strictly speaking, to which it substitutes its own logic. This logic is that of worldwide absorption, which dissolves the traditional bonds on which prior systems depended, a condition of its unbounded expansion. Now everything is unlatched and unshackled; at the same time as the national borders, the traditional separation of economy, politics, culture are erased gradually, at the same time as are that between manual and intellectual work, work time and leisure time, private and public, production and consumption. There is no longer even a demarcation between war and peace, which are as if fused, which translates into fact as a state of generalised, incubating war, obligatory accompaniment of imperial domination that imposes everywhere its pax belli. More generally still, the distinction between creation and destruction tends to disappear: power, extending its interventions beyond all limits, becomes power over life itself, power over all life, biopower, which, at the same time that it can at any moment erase life, takes on also the obligation of producing and regulating life, fashioning it in its image, which has as a consequence the abolition of the border between natural and artificial.
This operation of generalised desystematisation has considerable effects on human activity, which it transposes to a new level where it appears completely metamorphosed. One phase, that of modernity, where productive work producing material goods, modelled on the form of industrial production, has a tendency to be the exclusive affair of the working class, is succeeded by another, new phase where work becomes principally immaterial, angled toward the creation of informations, knowledges, ideas, images, relational figures, services, and even affects and subjectivities. The representation of work, which Marx, in his time, had serious reasons to enclose in strictly defined limits, on the model of industrial production, which had as a consequence, among others, to refuse to employees the status of workers as creators of value, finds itself at one blow enlarged; it becomes biopolitical work, which creates new forms of social life. This analysis, which I have summarised very generally, certainly corresponds to an evolution which is accomplishing itself before our eyes, and has doubtless yet to produce all its effects; and no one would deny the problems of work pose themselves today in different terms than when Marx composed Capital, or that new concepts are indispensable for thinking contemporary reality. All the same, is there really a reason to place back to back, as Hardt and Negri give the impression of doing, these two figures as exclusive, and inevitably essentialised, of the modern material and postmodern immaterial labour, as if the second figure had definitively expelled the first and taken its place? That the analysis of labour must be updated, taking into account the transformations in progress of its modalities of execution, its objects and results, is clear; but does this mean that this analysis must align itself with the discourse that accompanies these transformations, a discourse incontestably ideological, the background of which must be plumbed and discussed and not simply reproduced? Must we not, to counteract the evolution in progress, or better to counteract the manner in which it spontaneously represents itself, rematerialise the conception that we have of labour? This work that one calls immaterial because it is not executed necessarily at fixed hours between the walls of a factory, isn’t it still, though under new forms, material labour, and exploited labour? Understanding the present is not making an apology for it while neglecting to adopt with relation to it a critical distance; and there is in the dominant way we are fed, by those who claim to direct and who derive the benefits, let us call them by their name: capitalists, the vision of this process of immaterialisation of work, which justifies its flexibilisation, a term very fashionable lately, something rather too insistent, and also too interested, for us to merely accept it and take it at face value. And this could be the object of the first question posed to Hardt and Negri: their concern to adhere to the present reality, to better root their vision of the possible in reality, hasn’t it led them to establish, in opposition to the image of modernity they seek to demarcate, the unilateral image itself of a postmodernity entirely different to what preceeded it, image without doubt conforming to the portrait that this self proclaimed postmodernity offers of itself, but which is perhaps not in the least equal to its deeper reality of which it itself reveals, finally, nothing but the false consciousness? To be brusque about it, are there not very grave reasons to distrust the representation of a postmodernity the system of which situates itself in complete rupture with that of modernity?
Comment by chabert — October 22, 2007 @ 7:03 pm
Bonsoir mon Colonel, et merci for the comment and Macherey quote. That quotes a bit dense for my petit brain in its tired state just now, so I’ll have to come back to that later. For now, on the why part in your comment, I’m really not sure. Have you read this book Storming Heaven by Steve Wright? I’m biased because Steve’s a friend but I think it’s really excellent and unjustly under-read, it’s sort of an intellectual history of the operaist circles Negri came out of. From what I can recall from that and from the Negri collection Revolution Retrieved (it’s weird for me that this stuff is starting to feel rusty, as I used to have it much closer mental hand), Negri’s made these sorts of claims for a very long time - everything is different comrades, now is the moment, a new subject is upon us! In part that’s just the sort of marxist he is. This is a bit reductive but I think much of the architecture or infrastructure of his work hasn’t changed, the recent-ish vocabulary’s as much a paintjob as it is serious structural overhaul of his thought, in my opinion. I think it may be fair to accuse him of idealism in some respects, but I think he’s as much a mechanical determinist as he is an idealist - the new form of labor conditions the new form of the subject, the technical composition of the class conditions it political form, which is doubly frustrating because to my mind from what I’ve read of the operaismo stuff one of the most important bits is that it’s precisely the other way round: the technical composition is the product of the capitalist response to a prior political composition (a la when Marx says you could write a history of technology based on its use in breaking strikes etc).
take care,
Nate
Comment by Nate — October 22, 2007 @ 7:50 pm
thanks nate:
“a mechanical determinist as he is an idealist”
but mechanical determinism is idealism! (how can there be a materialist mechanical determinism, really? ) I think really all the post industrial mechanical determinisms are idealist… the determining thing is not matter but some spirit, concept or other. Something without mass. The determinant for popular post modern mechanistic determinisms is structure or form for example - (or, for Derrida, marking or writing) - for negri it’s more like a “theme” that determines, the equivalent of what would be a theme of a novel but derived from a picture of human affairs.
I haven’t read the book, but will; it looks very good.
I am always pitching this, but I think Jonathan Beller’s the Cinematic Mode of Production delivers a very persuasive hypothesis regarding why all these theorisers introduce these figures which reside in a demilitarised zone between matter and abstraction of one sort or another – spectrality, virtuality, immaterial labour – and what is prompting this flailing around with these tropes. This is why I inquired after what you thought was Negri’s attraction to these positions, which seem, on the descriptive level, so neolib; he’s a curious case because you can’t doubt his commitment, he went to prison, he’s not lying to himself about how horrible life is for everybody, he’s well above any suspicions of bad faith or fraud. Beller would explain it much as Debord would – what we have here is an extremely advanced state of commodity fetishism brought about by high levels of exposure to moving pictures and recorded sound.
Comment by chabert — October 23, 2007 @ 12:13 am
rather i mean “high levels of exposure to commodity moving pictures and recorded sound” (in the specific way they are inserted in social relations).
Comment by chabert — October 23, 2007 @ 12:16 am
ciao Colonel,
Agreed completely on the unity of idealism and vulgar materialism - but surely, comrade, it’s a dialectical unity, with vulgar materialism being merely the first negation of bourgeois idealism such that it still retains the idealist character of bourgeois thought.
Seriously though, I do agree, I just think there’s a difference between the idealism of a bad economistic marxist and the idealism of, say, a religious Hegelian, even though the two are in another and important sense cut from the same cloth.
More later, I need to get to bed so I can get up again too early and be exhausted and get back work.
take care,
Nate
Comment by Nate — October 23, 2007 @ 12:20 am
The interesting thing, to me, is that it seems that Negri wanted to assert in Time for Revolution that the labor of theory of value was always partly wrong, and that exchange value depended on the imposition, through force, of a system of valuation that bore no relationship to productive activity. I understand that he’s imagining a departure from the lab theory of value in a different way above, but there is a degree to which he had argued earlier that exchange value didn’t arise organically from a dialectic process of exchanges among producers but was imposed by the State (Deleuze’s read too).
I need to read that Beller book (it’s on my shelf!) but I think it’s not quite right to say that Debord would have read Negri’s ideas as merely ideological. I think it’s pretty clear that Debord thought there was something like “immaterial” production going on, that appearances and their mutual resonances had become a new kind of labor in which needs were directly produced and that, therefore, the sphere of the aesthetic or cultural could directly influence the economic. And this was something I think he would make a historical argument about–at one point, representation was ideology, now it’s directly productive. For Debord, exploitation just moves over to the side of consumption in the Welfarist state with increased standards of living for workers. For Negri it seems more magical and I’m not sure where he thinks value comes from. But both seem to underestimate the way in which the “new” form of production requires, indeed cannot exist without, industrial production, since the former is leveraged against the latter–whether it’s outsourced to the developing world, or to the future (as with speculative capitalism), or to the past (as with pillaging pensions and the like). It all requires industrial production (and of course, all depends upon the uncounted work of reproduction, housework, the informal economy, etc.)
Your critique of Negri is very well taken, and has helped me very much, Nate. But do you read the proportion of the immaterial labor as staying essentially the same throughout capitalism? Or as increasing in the 20th century? Even if it can’t be said to be “dominant,” it seems to me that it must be the latter.
Comment by Jasper — October 25, 2007 @ 1:59 am
Or rather, I should say, for Debord it–immaterial labor- is both ideology and value-generation in the late 20th century. And by moves over to the side of consumption, I mean that exploitation begins to function there alongside the workplace. That’s more correct.
Comment by Jasper — October 25, 2007 @ 2:13 am
hi Jasper,
Thanks for the kind words, always appreciated. I can’t speak to the proportion of immaterial labor involved in capitalism over time. I think Negri can’t either, despite his attempts to, I think his framework is too clumsy. It seems to me that the reproduction of labor power always involves affective and “immaterial” labors (the short book the Arcane of Reproduction by Leopoldina Fortunati basically makes this point, among other things). Workers have to be birthed, raised, educated (formally and informally) before they go to work, and have to be continually repaired and cared for during their working life. That’s immaterial labor. Or, biopolitical production. I’ve got a thing I wrote on this, if you’re interested, here - http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/biopolitical-capitalism/
A shorted related bit is my notes on this essay by the historian Jeanne Boydston - http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2007/04/19/is-the-value-of-housework/
None of this is meant to say that nothing has changed. Rather it’s meant to say that “increasing immaterial labor” is a clumsy characterization. It may well be that there’s more immaterial labor. It may well be that there’s the same quantity in the aggregate. It’s definitely the case that there are some new immaterial labors, and some new modes of older immaterial labors, and that there are some immaterial labors which haven’t changed much or at all for quite a long time.
Re: the labor theory of value, I think Negri’s very ambiguous. Some of the time he sounds like he’s saying “the imposition of the value form (ie, of capitalist social relations) and of measure of value is always a matter of force. At other times he sounds like he’s saying that nowadays value and measure is a matter of force. This include the claim that it’s harder to measure immaterial labor as such, so that there’s more of a distortion between the measures imposed on immaterial than material labor, which implies a claim to a certain adequacy of measure to material labor. That strikes me as wrong headed. Put differently, I think Negri’s theory of departure from the law of value is predicated on a flawed understanding of value during the era prior to the alleged departure. If one is less orthodox and mechanistic about that era, then the times after that era don’t look so incredibly different. Measure and the value form were always force and arbitrary.
Make sense?
take care,
Nate
Comment by Nate — October 25, 2007 @ 11:59 am
Thanks Jasper; Debord saw the present as the realisation of the model of capitalism drawn by Marx before it had really come completely into being. He saw complete and meaningful continuity. The spectacle is the result of capitalist expansion (not just outward over new populations, but inward deeper into the life of populations) and the progress of commodification. There is no break - the spectacle - “not a collection of images but social relations between people mediated by images” (bringing commodity fetishism to a highly developed state) - creates an illusion of a break (this is what I mean by saying he would have thought Negri was a victim of the spectacle), creates an illusion of social relations as relations between “immaterial” commodities, creates this illusion that Macherey suggests is only the “false consciousness” of the “new economy”.
I think debord was all about saying intervention to disrupt the spectacle could be influential, but also his position is despairing about that. He repeated often that purely discursive action was pointless, always reiterating that there was no point in analysing the relations of property if one was not actively engaged in trying to abolish them.
Comment by chabert — October 25, 2007 @ 4:45 pm
I mean the whole project of Debord and its praxis was an optimism of the will continually glossed by a profound pessimism of the intellect.
Comment by chabert — October 25, 2007 @ 4:51 pm
“Put differently, I think Negri’s theory of departure from the law of value is predicated on a flawed understanding of value during the era prior to the alleged departure. ”
I think the voluntarism too delivers this skewed idea of class struggle so how it determines is missed. Like: he and hardt give a lot of emphasis to the telecom infrastructure. But there is no recognition of the development as driven by the imperative to increase the productivity of labour. So also is missed that the ability to capitalise immaterial labour in better direct ways opens possibilities for increasing productivity with technological developments. But while recognising the role of the state, there is just an inattention to its specifics, like forms of property. Immaterial labour is always exploited, but historical developments allow for exploitation in new ways and monetisation and capitalisation that drive further developments. Like a kid’s liking of a cartoon character could only be exploited insofar as it was socialising that kid as a labourer eventually, producing him as a labourer with cultural knowledges etc. But once it is possible to directly capitalise his liking, capital gets a machine into his hand to increase the productivity of that labour that is his liking. He’s not really liking more. But the mechanisms - legal, financial, technical - for exploiting that liking and then capitalising it, making capital assets out of it - develop. But actual it seems that these sectors - culture industry, telecom, the financial sector - that negri and hardt emphasise really illustrate Marx’ model better, with fewer exceptions and caveats, than any before them. These sectors are really close to capitalism in that pure form, more than industries inherited and transformed by capitalism.
Comment by chabert — October 25, 2007 @ 5:05 pm
What in the hell is ‘immaterial labour’ anyway? Marx recognised from the start that labour processes are heterogeneous. Whatever problems ‘immaterial labour’ brings were already there in the difficulties of comparing different kinds of labour based on different kinds of skills. For Marx labour was only homogenised as abstract labour, which means it can never be read directly from the labour time of any individual. Abstract labour is collective labour and always was.
Comment by Mike Beggs — October 25, 2007 @ 7:26 pm
Mike, your comment reminds me that I think another place to push on Negri would be about the relationship between the labor process and the valorization process. Clearly the two are related, but I think Negri’s claim about immaterial labor is too neat in moving from a change in the labor process to a change in the valorization process. (And is too neat about how those processes as components or aspects of the working class in itself relate to the class for itself.)
Comment by Nate — October 25, 2007 @ 8:27 pm
I’m rereading the Boydston essay to teach it, and ran across this passage again:
“Working-class wives worked not only to avoid spending money altogether, but also to reduce the size of necessary expenditures. Important for both of these ends was the maintenance of friendly contacts with neighbors, to whom one might turn for goods or services either as a regular supplement to one’s own belongings or in periods of emergency. New to a building, neighborhood, or community, a woman depended upon her peers for information about the cheapest places to shop, the grocers least likely to cheat on weights and prices, and the likely spots for scavenging. Amicable relations with one’s neighbors could yield someone to sit with a sick child or a friend from whom one could borrow a pot or a few pieces of coal.” (14.)
This is immaterial labor. (So are the labors of care etc which make up an important part of the labors of reproducing labor power, though there’s also work like scavenging and gardening and so on which is more like material than immaterial labor, to stick with the terminology.) In particular, this is immaterial labor of the type that Hardt and Negri are really interested in: the production and modulation of social relations, which they call biopolitical labor, “labor that creates not only material goods but also relationships and ultimately social life itself.” (I don’t have the page number handy but could chase it up if needed.)
Comment by Nate — October 29, 2007 @ 7:44 am
You just somehow remind me of my great grandmother, who got really old so I knew her a little - she was an immigrant from Minsk. She was very resourceful, and she would show somebody how to do something, householdy or related to shopping, also home medical, and she would often say “dat’s from Mrs Villiamzin”. Mrs Williamson had been dead long before I was born; an old lady in a Brooklyn tenement, who took my 16 year old grandmother under her wing as it were, and showed her the ropes, how to speak english and be an american, how to function in her new environment. I remember being really shocked when my grandmother a few years after my great grandmother died mentioned that Mrs Williamson had been born a slave. Centuries of slavery also have to be taken into account when considering past periods in capitalism and how immaterial labour was exploited.
Comment by chabert — October 29, 2007 @ 4:45 pm
sixteen year old great grandmother
Comment by chabert — October 29, 2007 @ 4:47 pm