Comments on: … should this post be titled? http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2007/08/20/should-this-post-be-titled/ A working notebook Tue, 15 Dec 2009 12:22:46 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=1.5.1-alpha by: Nate http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2007/08/20/should-this-post-be-titled/#comment-1891 Tue, 21 Aug 2007 19:31:08 +0100 http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2007/08/20/should-this-post-be-titled/#comment-1891 hey Rob, Nice to hear from you. I'll check out that link soon, thanks. One thing I didn't say in hear that was in the back of my mind is a connection with issues of faith. I'm a devout atheist (and on occasion, assholishly so), but I've gotten a fair bit of mileage from parallels with questions of religious faith (I don't remember it very well anymore, but I remember find Kierkegaard very resonant and moving). In short, aside from the truth of the doctrine, there's commitment to the doctrine, which means building the (or an) organization which adheres to and interprets and tries to act upon the values of the doctrine. I'd imagine it's much more common that people affirm the truth of a doctrine without much commitment to it rather than people who don't affirm the truth of a doctrine but do commit to it (I'm told the latter people do exist, at least within catholicism). That's not quite right, actually, the commitment bit. Smaller than that, less than 'building the organization' is the conviction that the organization could be built, less commitment to the doctrine than strong feelings about the doctrine (not only is the doctrine true but it is worth while, so to speak, rather than sort of trivially true). I've really wrestled with this much more, that's why this is big on my mind. It doesn't seem to me that this is an objection to NP, though, just some thought stirred up as an eddy off the stream of discussion at Rough Theory and elsewhere. take care, Nate hey Rob,
Nice to hear from you. I’ll check out that link soon, thanks.
One thing I didn’t say in hear that was in the back of my mind is a connection with issues of faith. I’m a devout atheist (and on occasion, assholishly so), but I’ve gotten a fair bit of mileage from parallels with questions of religious faith (I don’t remember it very well anymore, but I remember find Kierkegaard very resonant and moving). In short, aside from the truth of the doctrine, there’s commitment to the doctrine, which means building the (or an) organization which adheres to and interprets and tries to act upon the values of the doctrine. I’d imagine it’s much more common that people affirm the truth of a doctrine without much commitment to it rather than people who don’t affirm the truth of a doctrine but do commit to it (I’m told the latter people do exist, at least within catholicism). That’s not quite right, actually, the commitment bit. Smaller than that, less than ‘building the organization’ is the conviction that the organization could be built, less commitment to the doctrine than strong feelings about the doctrine (not only is the doctrine true but it is worth while, so to speak, rather than sort of trivially true). I’ve really wrestled with this much more, that’s why this is big on my mind. It doesn’t seem to me that this is an objection to NP, though, just some thought stirred up as an eddy off the stream of discussion at Rough Theory and elsewhere.
take care,
Nate

]]> by: rob http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2007/08/20/should-this-post-be-titled/#comment-1889 Mon, 20 Aug 2007 19:12:57 +0100 http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2007/08/20/should-this-post-be-titled/#comment-1889 <blockquote>I think one of the questions bound up with what NP is working on is the degree to which these frameworks can and should be rendered fully consistent and recommendable.</blockquote> I originally thought that about NP's work, too, until a few exchanges — <a href="http://www.roughtheory.org/content/do-we-do-structuralism/#comment-15216" rel="nofollow">starting roughly here</a> (but tangled up with a separate discussion with someone else about "strcuture" and "post-structuralism") — helped clarify things for me. Now I think that if NP's seeking to "ground" a self-reflexive critical position, it's very much a contingent, unstable grounding, and so not what one would ordinarily think of as a grounding at all. E.g.: <blockquote>concepts like “grounding” are often positioned, either in frank reference to some kind of objectivity or, as you mention above, in reference to some kind of totality. One of the things I’m trying to explore is what it would mean to think concepts like grounding, if we aren’t seeking to do either of these things: does this mean the concept is impossible, or just transformed in interesting ways?</blockquote> Cheers rob

I think one of the questions bound up with what NP is working on is the degree to which these frameworks can and should be rendered fully consistent and recommendable.

I originally thought that about NP’s work, too, until a few exchanges — starting roughly here (but tangled up with a separate discussion with someone else about “strcuture” and “post-structuralism”) — helped clarify things for me. Now I think that if NP’s seeking to “ground” a self-reflexive critical position, it’s very much a contingent, unstable grounding, and so not what one would ordinarily think of as a grounding at all. E.g.:

concepts like “grounding” are often positioned, either in frank reference to some kind of objectivity or, as you mention above, in reference to some kind of totality. One of the things I’m trying to explore is what it would mean to think concepts like grounding, if we aren’t seeking to do either of these things: does this mean the concept is impossible, or just transformed in interesting ways?

Cheers
rob

]]> by: Nate http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2007/08/20/should-this-post-be-titled/#comment-1888 Mon, 20 Aug 2007 12:03:27 +0100 http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2007/08/20/should-this-post-be-titled/#comment-1888 hi NP, Thijs, Thijs, confidence is for keeping motivated for organizational projects in the face of a depressing world and aggressive bosses and their lackeys! NP, thanks for this. I think we're very close in many ways here (including a Lafargue streak, your comment at yours reminds me I want to reread that, being very lazy myself). I think the main (meta)theoretical difference has to do with grounding or fully establishing what you've called self-reflexive critical theory. I think I'm more pessimistic that it can be done, while optimistic about what can be accomplished when we take our common sense views or moral intuitions as the closest thing we can have to a solid foundation. I expect this is more a difference of degree and style than a difference of kind and substantive view. This also relates at least tangentially to the discussion Tom Grundlegung and I are having in fits and starts about MacIntyre and emotivism. I still want to read the rest of the comments at your and respond later when I've got more time and energy, I'll probly have more to say then. (I think you may have given me your cold, perhaps one of those computer viruses I hear so much about?) Also in case it wasn't clear, I wasn't voicing any anti-theory views. I think the differences between the types of theory you named (I liked your distinctions, by the way) are more like differences along a continuum than oppositions. The only major oppositions are related to institutional matters. take care, Nate hi NP, Thijs,

Thijs, confidence is for keeping motivated for organizational projects in the face of a depressing world and aggressive bosses and their lackeys!

NP, thanks for this. I think we’re very close in many ways here (including a Lafargue streak, your comment at yours reminds me I want to reread that, being very lazy myself). I think the main (meta)theoretical difference has to do with grounding or fully establishing what you’ve called self-reflexive critical theory. I think I’m more pessimistic that it can be done, while optimistic about what can be accomplished when we take our common sense views or moral intuitions as the closest thing we can have to a solid foundation. I expect this is more a difference of degree and style than a difference of kind and substantive view. This also relates at least tangentially to the discussion Tom Grundlegung and I are having in fits and starts about MacIntyre and emotivism.

I still want to read the rest of the comments at your and respond later when I’ve got more time and energy, I’ll probly have more to say then. (I think you may have given me your cold, perhaps one of those computer viruses I hear so much about?) Also in case it wasn’t clear, I wasn’t voicing any anti-theory views. I think the differences between the types of theory you named (I liked your distinctions, by the way) are more like differences along a continuum than oppositions. The only major oppositions are related to institutional matters.

take care,
Nate

]]> by: N. Pepperell http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2007/08/20/should-this-post-be-titled/#comment-1887 Mon, 20 Aug 2007 07:17:10 +0100 http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2007/08/20/should-this-post-be-titled/#comment-1887 Hey Nate - Late here, so apologies for not doing full justice (or, for that matter, even very partial justice) to your post. I just wanted to mention that I basically agree with this - in other words, I take the kind of theoretical work we've been talking about in this latest cross-blog discussion as having a specific kind of purpose, and not as being the sort of thing for which you hold up other sorts of things (not least because this kind of theory is, in many respects, parasitic on observing some of those other kinds of things... ;-P). The concepts we're playing with in this discussion in particular are at a sort of far edge of abstraction - and simply won't be immediately relevant for most purposes, although they can be handy in those aspects of contestation that spill over into academic debates. There are other sorts of theoretical work that can have more immediate practical use - both in the "conviction" sense that you mention above (overarching narratives that link local contestations to broader issues and render local experiences intelligible or meaningful in a broader context can be empowering), and in the "action orientation" sense (helping movements not get blindsided by unintended consequences they could do something about, if they knew to look out for them) - but none of this requires the sort of abstract and formal analysis on which this discussion has hinged: much more ad hoc forms of theorising are generally fine, and a very different mode of communication and interaction is required. And absolutely theory is a contribution, not some sort of hierarchically central contribution - a major goal, in a sense, is to try to keep theorists from getting in the way, through forms of theory that do damage ;-) On the normative issue you raise: I'm actually a sort of materialised Rortian (in the sense that you seem to be invoking him above) on this, as well - trying to understand a bit about where our common sense comes from, but treating this common sense as something that has simply arisen, generally for aleatory reasons, and generally when we were collectively trying to do anything but generating norms - but also as being as much of a foundation as we need, to do better than we are doing in our collective lives right now. Or something like that... ;-) Late. Tired. And feel a bit like I'm stalking you (across three blogs now!). :-) Take care... Hey Nate - Late here, so apologies for not doing full justice (or, for that matter, even very partial justice) to your post. I just wanted to mention that I basically agree with this - in other words, I take the kind of theoretical work we’ve been talking about in this latest cross-blog discussion as having a specific kind of purpose, and not as being the sort of thing for which you hold up other sorts of things (not least because this kind of theory is, in many respects, parasitic on observing some of those other kinds of things… ;-P). The concepts we’re playing with in this discussion in particular are at a sort of far edge of abstraction - and simply won’t be immediately relevant for most purposes, although they can be handy in those aspects of contestation that spill over into academic debates. There are other sorts of theoretical work that can have more immediate practical use - both in the “conviction” sense that you mention above (overarching narratives that link local contestations to broader issues and render local experiences intelligible or meaningful in a broader context can be empowering), and in the “action orientation” sense (helping movements not get blindsided by unintended consequences they could do something about, if they knew to look out for them) - but none of this requires the sort of abstract and formal analysis on which this discussion has hinged: much more ad hoc forms of theorising are generally fine, and a very different mode of communication and interaction is required. And absolutely theory is a contribution, not some sort of hierarchically central contribution - a major goal, in a sense, is to try to keep theorists from getting in the way, through forms of theory that do damage ;-)

On the normative issue you raise: I’m actually a sort of materialised Rortian (in the sense that you seem to be invoking him above) on this, as well - trying to understand a bit about where our common sense comes from, but treating this common sense as something that has simply arisen, generally for aleatory reasons, and generally when we were collectively trying to do anything but generating norms - but also as being as much of a foundation as we need, to do better than we are doing in our collective lives right now. Or something like that… ;-)

Late. Tired. And feel a bit like I’m stalking you (across three blogs now!). :-) Take care…

]]> by: thijs http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2007/08/20/should-this-post-be-titled/#comment-1886 Mon, 20 Aug 2007 02:50:40 +0100 http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2007/08/20/should-this-post-be-titled/#comment-1886 What in the hell... is confidence for anyway? :) What in the hell… is confidence for anyway? :)

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