-Rorty’s interest in a “post-philosophical” culture can also be seen as a kind of indifference, because he presumes that (at least some) philosophical distinctions don’t make a difference… So, it’s a pragmatic indifference to philosophy.
-Rorty’s pragmatic indifference would annoy me, but it’s in keeping with what I take to be an eminently sensible skeptical tendency… When a philosophy is contradictory or the converse of the position someone maintains is equally likely, you just disregard the position, rather than trying to argue with it. That’s in Sextus Empiricus.
-Berkeley also has a theory of indifference. I think Locke, Berkeley, and Hume are, for the most part, engaged in a controversy with one another about universals, and their relations to particulars. Locke says universals are abstracted from particulars. Berkeley says no, universals are just particulars, regarded with indifference toward their particularity. Hume says we can’t really be indifferent towards particulars, so we imaginatively associate them with other particulars, and call the associations universals.