Comments on: … was Althusser’s labor? http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2006/11/25/was-althussers-labor/ A working notebook Tue, 15 Dec 2009 12:20:00 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=1.5.1-alpha by: Nate http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2006/11/25/was-althussers-labor/#comment-1082 Tue, 28 Nov 2006 23:47:41 +0000 http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2006/11/25/was-althussers-labor/#comment-1082 I'm like a cheap apple (pithy). Email me your phone number!! I’m like a cheap apple (pithy). Email me your phone number!!

]]> by: Colin http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2006/11/25/was-althussers-labor/#comment-1081 Tue, 28 Nov 2006 18:57:45 +0000 http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2006/11/25/was-althussers-labor/#comment-1081 As usual, the pith is yours. --cm As usual, the pith is yours.
–cm

]]> by: Nate http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2006/11/25/was-althussers-labor/#comment-1080 Mon, 27 Nov 2006 21:55:47 +0000 http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2006/11/25/was-althussers-labor/#comment-1080 hi Colin, Agreed. Hence the weird hoops that some post-structural folk jump through re: absolute freedom ("it's all discursive, we just need to redefine the terms!") to absolute unfreedom ("language speaks the subject, we are merely epiphenomena determined by structure!"). take care, Nate hi Colin,
Agreed. Hence the weird hoops that some post-structural folk jump through re: absolute freedom (”it’s all discursive, we just need to redefine the terms!”) to absolute unfreedom (”language speaks the subject, we are merely epiphenomena determined by structure!”).
take care,
Nate

]]> by: Colin http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2006/11/25/was-althussers-labor/#comment-1079 Mon, 27 Nov 2006 19:22:13 +0000 http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2006/11/25/was-althussers-labor/#comment-1079 Hey Nate-- My response to the Althusser was probably overly formal... but I think the point is that it's silly to think in all or nothing terms about determinism and freedom. As if one is either born under the crushing weight of the world and the beliefs (ideologies) commonly held one's present historical moment, and is completely determined by them, or breaks with them completely, opens up a "void," and is therefore "free." The opposition forces you into absurd positions, like saying "if you're born at a certain place and in a certain time, then you're determined by those things, and, for that reason, are not free." To that, I think the correct response is "I may not have chosen where or when or to whom I was born, but that doesn't mean I'm not free now..." With ideology, it might go "I was indoctrinated in such and such a manner, according to my class interest, but upon reflection, or out of the sheer spontaneity of my thought, I realize that I think x, y, and z, which may or may not correspond to my class interest, and the general ideas circulating in my time." Obviously, whatever one reflects upon or thinks about is going to have some relation to the ideas circulating in one's time. But they're not determined by them. That would be going far too far (but that's the only context in which a "break" is really necessary). I don't know. Maybe I'm just ranting. --cm Hey Nate–
My response to the Althusser was probably overly formal… but I think the point is that it’s silly to think in all or nothing terms about determinism and freedom. As if one is either born under the crushing weight of the world and the beliefs (ideologies) commonly held one’s present historical moment, and is completely determined by them, or breaks with them completely, opens up a “void,” and is therefore “free.” The opposition forces you into absurd positions, like saying “if you’re born at a certain place and in a certain time, then you’re determined by those things, and, for that reason, are not free.” To that, I think the correct response is “I may not have chosen where or when or to whom I was born, but that doesn’t mean I’m not free now…” With ideology, it might go “I was indoctrinated in such and such a manner, according to my class interest, but upon reflection, or out of the sheer spontaneity of my thought, I realize that I think x, y, and z, which may or may not correspond to my class interest, and the general ideas circulating in my time.” Obviously, whatever one reflects upon or thinks about is going to have some relation to the ideas circulating in one’s time. But they’re not determined by them. That would be going far too far (but that’s the only context in which a “break” is really necessary).
I don’t know. Maybe I’m just ranting.
–cm

]]> by: Nate http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2006/11/25/was-althussers-labor/#comment-1078 Mon, 27 Nov 2006 03:26:52 +0000 http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2006/11/25/was-althussers-labor/#comment-1078 hi Colin, I agree with you on the importance of mediation, thanks for pointing that out. On the other hand, I think to insist that one can choose one's beginning just displaces what Althusser (perhaps rather poorly) is pointing out, instead of resolving it. From where and in relation to what does one choose one's beginning? That is, where does the beginning of beginning-choice occur? In a location of one's own choosing, or in a location where one finds oneself? I'm not a fan of givenness, but I think that there are things which are experienced as if given, and I think that without a concept of that (experienced as if given) one ends up implying another type of immediacy - the immediacy of choosing a beginning. take care, Nate ps- email me your phone number please hi Colin,
I agree with you on the importance of mediation, thanks for pointing that out. On the other hand, I think to insist that one can choose one’s beginning just displaces what Althusser (perhaps rather poorly) is pointing out, instead of resolving it. From where and in relation to what does one choose one’s beginning? That is, where does the beginning of beginning-choice occur? In a location of one’s own choosing, or in a location where one finds oneself? I’m not a fan of givenness, but I think that there are things which are experienced as if given, and I think that without a concept of that (experienced as if given) one ends up implying another type of immediacy - the immediacy of choosing a beginning.
take care,
Nate

ps- email me your phone number please

]]> by: Colin http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2006/11/25/was-althussers-labor/#comment-1077 Sun, 26 Nov 2006 12:51:07 +0000 http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2006/11/25/was-althussers-labor/#comment-1077 Incidental comments... It strikes me that Althusser's claim that "it is impossible to choose one's beginnings" is false, as is his claim that "for a thinker, this world is immediately the world of the living thoughts of his time, the ideological world where he is born into thought." I think they're (potentially) false for the same reason... It's never the case that "the world" is given IMMEDIATELY, nor that a thinker's (or anyone else's) world is IMMEDIATELY "the world of the living thoughts of his time, the ideological world where is he born into thought." There's no such thing as an immediate "world," much less an immediate "ideological world." I suspect that the assertion that there is an "immediate (ideological) world" is the result of a pretty crude kind of historicism, one that presumes that historical agents are necessarily and sufficiently determined by their "age" or "epoch." Then, when a "break" appears in that "age," or someone seems to "break" with their "age," one declares the "age" broken, rather than presuming that it was never quite fixed (immediate) to begin with... Doesn't it make more sense to maintain that the "world" is never immediately given, that it's a context in which one acts, in concert with or in opposition to others, in fields within which there are a number or actualities, a number of releveant agents and forces, and a number or possibilities to be determined? Doesn't this mean that the world is never "immediately" given, but, rather, made, through work, through struggle, and/or through compromise and/or agreement? What's more, doesn't it make more sense to suppose that the "ideological world" is never immediately given, that it's a site of contestation and struggle, within which historical agents are located and localizable, but also able to alienate, detach, and de-territorialize themselves(precisely because the ideological field is not immediately given, and therefore not really "closed")? If the latter is true, than one can choose one's beginnings (as in "I don't think that the opinion which is generally held about subject u at the present time is correct, for reason v, which relates to interest w. I therefore choose to begin at point x, derive y from x, and conclude that z is and/or should be the case"). It just seems stupid to suppose that there is something determinate called the "immmedaite (ideological) world" which we're "born into" and therefore either necessarily reproduce (identically? unlikely...) or break with (entirely? equally unlikel...) Incidental comments…
It strikes me that Althusser’s claim that “it is impossible to choose one’s beginnings” is false, as is his claim that “for a thinker, this world is immediately the world of the living thoughts of his time, the ideological world where he is born into thought.”
I think they’re (potentially) false for the same reason… It’s never the case that “the world” is given IMMEDIATELY, nor that a thinker’s (or anyone else’s) world is IMMEDIATELY “the world of the living thoughts of his time, the ideological world where is he born into thought.” There’s no such thing as an immediate “world,” much less an immediate “ideological world.”
I suspect that the assertion that there is an “immediate (ideological) world” is the result of a pretty crude kind of historicism, one that presumes that historical agents are necessarily and sufficiently determined by their “age” or “epoch.” Then, when a “break” appears in that “age,” or someone seems to “break” with their “age,” one declares the “age” broken, rather than presuming that it was never quite fixed (immediate) to begin with…
Doesn’t it make more sense to maintain that the “world” is never immediately given, that it’s a context in which one acts, in concert with or in opposition to others, in fields within which there are a number or actualities, a number of releveant agents and forces, and a number or possibilities to be determined? Doesn’t this mean that the world is never “immediately” given, but, rather, made, through work, through struggle, and/or through compromise and/or agreement?
What’s more, doesn’t it make more sense to suppose that the “ideological world” is never immediately given, that it’s a site of contestation and struggle, within which historical agents are located and localizable, but also able to alienate, detach, and de-territorialize themselves(precisely because the ideological field is not immediately given, and therefore not really “closed”)? If the latter is true, than one can choose one’s beginnings (as in “I don’t think that the opinion which is generally held about subject u at the present time is correct, for reason v, which relates to interest w. I therefore choose to begin at point x, derive y from x, and conclude that z is and/or should be the case”). It just seems stupid to suppose that there is something determinate called the “immmedaite (ideological) world” which we’re “born into” and therefore either necessarily reproduce (identically? unlikely…) or break with (entirely? equally unlikel…)

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