Comments on: … is up with theology? http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2005/12/11/88/ A working notebook Tue, 15 Dec 2009 06:23:04 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=1.5.1-alpha by: Nate http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2005/12/11/88/#comment-188 Thu, 15 Dec 2005 06:17:31 +0000 http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2005/12/11/88/#comment-188 Further notes to self - found a bit of Foucault I liked, and which struck me as resonant with some of this. "The subject who speaks in this discourse cannot occupy the position of the jurist or the philosopher, or in other words, the position of the universal subject. (...) [This subject] is caught up in the battle, has adversaries and is fighting to win (...) trying to assert a right; but (...) a singular right that is marked by a relationship of conquest, domination, or seniority (...) the perspectival and strategic truth that will allow [this subject] to be victorious. We have, then, a political and historical discourse that lays claims to truth and right, but which explicitly excludes itself from juridico-philosophical universality. (...) It is a matter of establishing a right that is stamped with dissymmetry and that functions as a privilege that has to be either maintained or reestablished (...) a truth that functions as a weapon. For a subject speaking such a discourse, the universal truth and general right are illusions or traps." (Society Must Be Defended p268-9.) Presumably the right that MF likes is a moral right, not a juridical one, but I'm not sure. That's I'd want to read it, anyway, as something along the lines of WB's divine. One other thing, to remember to try and write about - reread the WB Work of Art in the Age of Technical Reproduction essay... I remember really liking that back in the day, but damn, there's some seriously old fashioned orthodox marxism in there - and not in any kind of good way - at the beginning and end, and at least one moment in the middle. Further notes to self -
found a bit of Foucault I liked, and which struck me as resonant with some of this.

“The subject who speaks in this discourse cannot occupy the position of the jurist or the philosopher, or in other words, the position of the universal subject. (…) [This subject] is caught up in the battle, has adversaries and is fighting to win (…) trying to assert a right; but (…) a singular right that is marked by a relationship of conquest, domination, or seniority (…) the perspectival and strategic truth that will allow [this subject] to be victorious. We have, then, a political and historical discourse that lays claims to truth and right, but which explicitly excludes itself from juridico-philosophical universality. (…) It is a matter of establishing a right that is stamped with dissymmetry and that functions as a privilege that has to be either maintained or reestablished (…) a truth that functions as a weapon. For a subject speaking such a discourse, the universal truth and general right are illusions or traps.” (Society Must Be Defended p268-9.) Presumably the right that MF likes is a moral right, not a juridical one, but I’m not sure. That’s I’d want to read it, anyway, as something along the lines of WB’s divine.

One other thing, to remember to try and write about - reread the WB Work of Art in the Age of Technical Reproduction essay… I remember really liking that back in the day, but damn, there’s some seriously old fashioned orthodox marxism in there - and not in any kind of good way - at the beginning and end, and at least one moment in the middle.

]]> by: Nate http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2005/12/11/88/#comment-185 Wed, 14 Dec 2005 03:12:49 +0000 http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2005/12/11/88/#comment-185 note to self... I had a conversation with my friend Nathan Sanchez tonight about some of this, regarding Agamben. My sense is that Agamben makes Benjaminian moves and Schmittian moves, and does so in a way (or he thinks) that holds them equivalent, or in his terms places them in a zone of indistinction. I need to look back over my notes and his work that I've read, but I recall him saying, and this is how Nathan reads him, that the sovereign violence - or mythic violence - and divine violence are ultimately indistinguishable. That's the problem I've got with him, mainly. He lays out a pure language, a pure violence, and a pure means (a trio, but also the latter is a name for what the former two fall under), which in some sense characterize both the mythical and the divine. He also makes it sound sometimes like his categories of exception and example are indistinct, or, put another way, he universalizes the exception. Nathan said someone he know who can do the math involved with set theory claims that Agamben is right about the exception and the example in set theory. Well and good, I have no idea if that's so, but to my mind this is a category mistake. Politics isn't math. Saying "both of these look the same from this perspective" is, to my mind, an error in that perspective to some degree. For instance, from the perspective of breathing oxygen both fascists and enemies of fascism are the same (ie, oxygen-breathers). That's trivially true, though, and is just evidence that that idiom in which the commonality appears isn't a very useful one. (Which is not to say that all idioms in which commonalities appear should be rejected - I think there's a claim to be made about the USSR and the US having much in common, both as species of capitalism, for instance. The question is intead what commonalities and what differences, and what do they mean and what use are they. Agamben collapses important differences, that's the problem, not the collapsing of differences as such.) I think some of the roots of this may be in Benjamin, B may be inconsistent or ambiguous, I'm not sure. If I have time over the holidays I may read more of B's stuff, I think, as I think I said above, his stuff on language may be a place where Agamben's readings have some purchase. (Also need to read more of Giorgio and re-read the other stuff I've read before, to make sure I'm not off the mark here.) note to self…
I had a conversation with my friend Nathan Sanchez tonight about some of this, regarding Agamben. My sense is that Agamben makes Benjaminian moves and Schmittian moves, and does so in a way (or he thinks) that holds them equivalent, or in his terms places them in a zone of indistinction. I need to look back over my notes and his work that I’ve read, but I recall him saying, and this is how Nathan reads him, that the sovereign violence - or mythic violence - and divine violence are ultimately indistinguishable. That’s the problem I’ve got with him, mainly. He lays out a pure language, a pure violence, and a pure means (a trio, but also the latter is a name for what the former two fall under), which in some sense characterize both the mythical and the divine. He also makes it sound sometimes like his categories of exception and example are indistinct, or, put another way, he universalizes the exception. Nathan said someone he know who can do the math involved with set theory claims that Agamben is right about the exception and the example in set theory. Well and good, I have no idea if that’s so, but to my mind this is a category mistake. Politics isn’t math. Saying “both of these look the same from this perspective” is, to my mind, an error in that perspective to some degree. For instance, from the perspective of breathing oxygen both fascists and enemies of fascism are the same (ie, oxygen-breathers). That’s trivially true, though, and is just evidence that that idiom in which the commonality appears isn’t a very useful one. (Which is not to say that all idioms in which commonalities appear should be rejected - I think there’s a claim to be made about the USSR and the US having much in common, both as species of capitalism, for instance. The question is intead what commonalities and what differences, and what do they mean and what use are they. Agamben collapses important differences, that’s the problem, not the collapsing of differences as such.)
I think some of the roots of this may be in Benjamin, B may be inconsistent or ambiguous, I’m not sure. If I have time over the holidays I may read more of B’s stuff, I think, as I think I said above, his stuff on language may be a place where Agamben’s readings have some purchase. (Also need to read more of Giorgio and re-read the other stuff I’ve read before, to make sure I’m not off the mark here.)

]]> by: Eric http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2005/12/11/88/#comment-180 Tue, 13 Dec 2005 11:41:15 +0000 http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2005/12/11/88/#comment-180 Nate, thanks for the link. I'll check it out. Nate, thanks for the link. I’ll check it out.

]]> by: Nate http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2005/12/11/88/#comment-178 Mon, 12 Dec 2005 15:59:01 +0000 http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2005/12/11/88/#comment-178 hi Eric, Thanks for the comments. I'm not very familiar with Benjamin in general and so can't really say if/when/where he elaborates much further on this nonviolent agreement. The quote I used, though, is selective on my part: the rest of the line identifies this sphere with language and with understanding (and identifies the language and understanding). I have no idea what to do with any of that, though my impulse is to want to say that it seems obvious to me that there can be violence in language (any of us who get paid to talk in some fashion experience a certain violence of waged labor, and anyone who's ever had a reasonably big fight with a partner should know this as well). I may be missing the point, though, as I don't really know Benjamin's philosophy of language. The little bits of it I've encountered strike me as wrongheaded (Agamben as well). But yeah, it sounds like gobbledygook to me too. I think the theological stuff may be usefully read metaphorically, but the 'inaccessible' thing just seems like a mistake, an excess on WB's part. On another note, I've just started reading a bit of Sorel as part of a longer and slow-moving project of trying to get to know some of the more intellectually sophisticated exponents of syndicalism, and to figure out more of what Benjamin's on about. At the end of the critique of violence B contrasts mythic with divine violence, the latter being just a moment of founding or preserving law. I think this is B subtly having a go at Sorel, who is all for mythic violence (at least that's my impression in the little bit of S that I've read so far). take care, Nate ps- if you're interested in this Benjamin piece Craig had a link to it in e-form somewhere over at Theoria. It's a reasonably short essay, if you've got the time. If you do read please let me know what you think. hi Eric,
Thanks for the comments. I’m not very familiar with Benjamin in general and so can’t really say if/when/where he elaborates much further on this nonviolent agreement. The quote I used, though, is selective on my part: the rest of the line identifies this sphere with language and with understanding (and identifies the language and understanding).
I have no idea what to do with any of that, though my impulse is to want to say that it seems obvious to me that there can be violence in language (any of us who get paid to talk in some fashion experience a certain violence of waged labor, and anyone who’s ever had a reasonably big fight with a partner should know this as well). I may be missing the point, though, as I don’t really know Benjamin’s philosophy of language. The little bits of it I’ve encountered strike me as wrongheaded (Agamben as well).
But yeah, it sounds like gobbledygook to me too. I think the theological stuff may be usefully read metaphorically, but the ‘inaccessible’ thing just seems like a mistake, an excess on WB’s part.
On another note, I’ve just started reading a bit of Sorel as part of a longer and slow-moving project of trying to get to know some of the more intellectually sophisticated exponents of syndicalism, and to figure out more of what Benjamin’s on about. At the end of the critique of violence B contrasts mythic with divine violence, the latter being just a moment of founding or preserving law. I think this is B subtly having a go at Sorel, who is all for mythic violence (at least that’s my impression in the little bit of S that I’ve read so far).
take care,
Nate

ps- if you’re interested in this Benjamin piece Craig had a link to it in e-form somewhere over at Theoria. It’s a reasonably short essay, if you’ve got the time. If you do read please let me know what you think.

]]> by: Eric http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2005/12/11/88/#comment-177 Mon, 12 Dec 2005 06:48:58 +0000 http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2005/12/11/88/#comment-177 Nate, I like the points and questions you raise in the "digression." I haven't read any of these early Benjamin essays, so I wonder if you could tell us if he elaborates anymore on the nonviolent sphere of human agreement? I also wonder how he discerns this and where the relationship arises. How is it inaccesible? In a way it sounds like spiritualist gobbledygook. I like that you add the concepts of perspectivalism and antagonism to this notion, but they seem more plausible to me than some mysterious exception to force. The early Benjamin stuff sounds quite strange to me. I'm more familiar with the 30s work, which is excellent. But like you, I'm confused by some of the more outwardly spiritual stuff. Nate,

I like the points and questions you raise in the “digression.” I haven’t read any of these early Benjamin essays, so I wonder if you could tell us if he elaborates anymore on the nonviolent sphere of human agreement? I also wonder how he discerns this and where the relationship arises. How is it inaccesible? In a way it sounds like spiritualist gobbledygook. I like that you add the concepts of perspectivalism and antagonism to this notion, but they seem more plausible to me than some mysterious exception to force.

The early Benjamin stuff sounds quite strange to me. I’m more familiar with the 30s work, which is excellent. But like you, I’m confused by some of the more outwardly spiritual stuff.

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