October 17, 2005

… time is it?

Filed under: Real Subsumption, Marx, Negri

This is a review I wrote of Jason Read’s book. The review comes off too harsh (still that kind of marxist I guess, unfortunately). It’s a great book. Just not perfect. I got a lot out of writing the review, though that’s not a promise to any readers. I’ve written to Jason about doing an interview and he’s agreed. If anyone has questions to suggest - or just wants to discuss - Read’s work I’d be happy to hear.

Jason Read, The Micro-Politics of Capital: Marx and the Prehistory of the Present, SUNY Press, New York 2003

Jason Read places a wide range of material often thought divergent into one contiguous (though variegated) terrain. The Micro-Politics of Capital engages ’structural’ Marxists including Althusser, Balibar, and Ranciere; ‘autonomist’ Marxists like Negri, Tronti, and Virno; and ‘post-structuralists’ like Foucault and Deleuze. Read produces both an erudite comparative study and reading of Marx and resources for a living materialist and communist thought. It is only to be expected, of course, that tensions traverse this project, in a fashion similar to “the tension between different logics in Marx’s writing” which the book foregrounds [Read, 16]. This review first provides an overview of the book then turns to one of the book’s tension, that over the temporal register to which the book applies.

In the first chapter Read focuses on two moments of Marx’s writings, the section in Capital on primitive accumulation and the Grundrisse notebooks “Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations.” In these sections, Read unearths the question of subjectivity as an important - though sometimes concealed - moment of both Marx’s thought and of capitalist production. Subjectivity appears as a negative moment, when Marx critiques capital’s apologists by uncovering capital’s’original sin’, the bloody expropriation of the commons deployed to produce the ‘free proletariat’ which became the laboring subject required by the capital relation. Read finds a positive moment in the Grundrisse selections, which emphasize the active role subjectivity plays, as much artisan of social relation as artifact. Read thus underscores Althusser’s point that the reproduction of the social relations of production is the presupposition needed for production to continue.

Marx once noted that production requires a prior distribution of productive relations [Grundrisse, 96], and it is this distribution which Read identifies as simultaneously the production and product of subjectivity. The actively productive and yet historically produced character of subjectivity problematizes the distinction between subject and object, as well as attempts to point to one or the other as sole source of causal determination. This means”[e]very effect is equally and at the same time a cause”, that is, “[e]lements of the capitalist mode of production that would appear to be its effects […] must equally be thought of as causes and elements of its functioning” [Read, 32]. Althusser called this immanent causality, part of the problematization of the concept ‘mode of production,’ which must be rethought as “a production of subjectivity and social relations rather than simply things” [Read, 110]. Mode of production is not simply an economistic ‘objective’ matter, because subjectivity has an objectivity and enters into economy.

Subjectivity, of course, does not exist in itself, but rather always exists as modalities of subjectivity. In chapter two, Read develops this point, and attempts to sketch aspects of the specific changes in the mode of subjectivity bound up with the transition to capitalism. Read defines capital as embodying an antagonistic logic, which means that struggles and conflicts between the subjects of the capital relation – and, on the part of the working class, struggles against subjectification in the role demanded by capital – are the constitutive process of the capitalist mode of production as it changes over time. Understanding the history and the present of the mode of production is a question of understanding changing and mutable relations of power, subordination, and refusal.

In the final chapter of the book Read turns from pre-history to the most recent period of capitalism, known to some authors as Post-Fordism. It is in this chapter that tension around temporality, present throughout the book, fully manifests. Read uncritically accepts a historical periodization drawn from Negri, based on the distinction of formal and real subsumption. Formal subsumption is the imposition of capitalist command over prior forms of production, whereas real subsumption is the direct intervention into the forms of the labor process by capital. In Negri’s work, real subsumption is a historical epoch. For Negri, it is under the era of real subsumption that capitalism becomes biopolitical and subjectivity is set to labor. For Read, however, every mode of production and every moment in the history of capitalist production is bound up with the antagonistic production of subjectivity, so it is not clear on what grounds Read accepts the historical narrative of formal/real subsumption.

Taken to its logical conclusion, Read’s problematizing conception of mode of production renders a number of received distinctions and categories – those between production and reproduction, society, politics and economy, subject and object, to name a few – highly fluid and unstable. The task for thought is to trace the changing relations named by and the modalities of subjectivity bound up with which these distinctions and categories, as well as the struggles constitutive of their historical change. If these distinctions and categories cease to be useful then new analytical tools must be sought. Read states as much, and provides much in the way of resources for this process. It is a pity, then, that Read does not similarly subject the categories of formal and real subsumption to interrogation and render them fluid as he does to other categories. The tension between these perspectives is the temporal tension in Read’s book, which has to do with what temporal or historical – or perhaps, metahistorical – register the book applies to. This can be phrased essentially as a question – when is Jason Read’s book true? – which different moments of the work answer in different ways.

The Micro-Politics of Capital is peppered with phrases that operate in two distinct relations to time. The first is an eternal time, a meta-historical time. For example: “social relations are prior to, and determinate of, the technological relations.” [Read, 52] This phrase refers to social relations as such, and thus, if true then it is true any mode of production whatsoever and at the very least is true of the capitalist mode of production for the entirety of its history. This implies a critique of positions, like parts of Marxism, which see technology as politically neutral or as objectively determining history. Read’s arguments – producing a conceptual fluidity in our understandings of production, reproduction, society, economy, and so forth – operates at this same temporal register.

There is a second temporal register in Read’s book, as when Read state that ours is “an age in which capital has extended beyond the walls of the factory to encompass all of social space.” [Read, 14] This statement occupies or produces a time of the present as transition, an event horizon between a determinate past and a rapidly approaching future. The time in this type of statement – which occurs throughout the writing of Negri, from whom these aspects of Read’s work are largely drawn – has a paradoxical effect.

Read states “it is no longer possible to separate capital, as the producer of goods and commodities, from what used to be called the superstructure,” an apparent claim about the present [Read, 2]. The heart of the matter, however, is the “it is no longer possible”, which marks an absolute disjunction between past and present, and implies a specific story about the past. To say “it is no longer possible” to distinguish economic base and cultural superstructure means that it once was possible to correctly make such a distinction. And yet, a large portion of Read’s argument implies that the conceptual division of base-superstructure – or politics-economics, production-reproduction, etc – was never correct.

The point has a political valence: to say “capital has extended” beyond the factory means that capital’s command and resistance against capital occurs not only in designated workplaces but throughout the social field, such that the industrial working class is not the privileged political or historical agent which much of Marxism takes it to be. But, “has extended” implies that this is only now the case, such that the factoryism of traditional Marxism was, until recently correct. Much of Read’s argument implies that the exclusive focus on the industrial proletariat was both a theoretical and political error. That is, there is an implied critique to be made here of the thought and strategies pursued put forward by Marxists and working class movements for much of history (and still advocated by many today).

By temporally localizing his own theoretical innovations to an only now present moment Read limits his own ideas’ critical force and utility for Marxian historiography. Worse yet, by defining the present in contradistinction to a falsified past – a definition of the past which is all the more strange in that it is undercut by a substantial part of the rest of his argument – Read risks producing the mere image of an understanding of the present. This image consists in speaking of general historical conditions of production as if they were specific only to the present, and so threatens to impede discussions of concrete problems of power and organization faced by movements today. To paraphrase Deleuze, the political issue is not what is new or old, but rather to always search for new weapons. Read blunts the very theoretical weapons he offers by entangling them in a periodizing temporality, they must be deployed with a different – and currently absent – communist conception of time in order to achieve full efficacy.

4 Comments »

The URI to TrackBack this entry is: http://whatinthehell.blogsome.com/2005/10/17/time-is-it/trackback/

  1. Ask him whether he thinks that organisation of a book around proper names is a condition of the book’s production, or more generally the production of books. But that’s a question that might seem obscure outside the discussion here.

    Comment by s0metim3s — October 20, 2005 @ 8:16 am

  2. hi Angela,
    I’ll have another look at your review and see if that helps shake up some questions to pose. I certainly share with Read a penchant for, as you put it before, focusing on names rather than themes. It’s a habit to be broken for sure.
    take care,
    Nate

    Comment by Nate — October 24, 2005 @ 3:59 am

  3. I’m not opposed to it. Sometimes, it’s useful. Sometimes not. My sense though is that it’s a protocol of the academy (and more so in phds than perhaps anywhere else), and for that reason alone the question needs to be posed every time as to whether it’s appropriate, what it does, what it doesn’t allow, etc.

    Comment by s0metim3s — October 24, 2005 @ 5:03 am

  4. Agreed. I’ve read this book The Ignorant Schoolmaster twice now and have been trying to think about it in regard to the labor process of graduate level education, which I’m newly inserted into. Ranciere’s comments on stultification are really interesting and useful for me, that one of the main things that schools produce is servility, fear of one’s own ability to act, which in turn makes on less likely to act. I’ve definitely encountered this already in school. There are a whole set of conversational power plays that one can operate, to score points and to prevent others from scoring points, and which are at least indirectly connected with getting grades and funding (since it’s impressive students that get money). These power plays help one to establish hierarchies, help one changes one’s own (and others’) relative position within the hierarchies, as well as having - at least for me - powerful emotional effects of instilling feelings of fear, self-doubt, inadequacy, etc. This in turn helps create situations where people act on others in ways that keeps the whole ball rolling.

    I’ve been using the Ignorant Schoolmaster as a form of psychic self-defense, to try and see through what happens in the classroom (and in the extensions of the classroom into other parts of life which students often effect, myself included), and to respond to it with anger instead of fear. (I think anger generally beats fear, at least if the quantities are right, in the game of psychological rock-paper-scissors.)

    This is all a long digression, but my sense is that the way of writing and speaking using names is a holdover from these aspects of the labor process in universities, and at least in some cases a continuing (re)production of the same processes. In regard to all this, I think I’d want to say that my undergraduate analytic philosophy courses tended to involve less of the big names power play and more of the ruling things out of bounds power play (sometimes rather viciously and with powerful rhetorical moves). I think the former allows one to do almost whatever one wants, including what I think are sometimes logical leaps, provided one has enough names on the scorecard (which means one has to do the labor of learning and doing effective name dropping), while the latter doesn’t require the same name-dropping labors but limits the range of topics that are admissible. Anyway, thanks for the comments.
    take care,
    Nate

    Comment by Nate — October 24, 2005 @ 2:35 pm

RSS feed for comments on this post.

Leave a comment

Line and paragraph breaks automatic, e-mail address never displayed, HTML allowed: <a href="" title=""> <abbr title=""> <acronym title=""> <b> <blockquote cite=""> <code> <em> <i> <strike> <strong>



Anti-spam measure: please retype the above text into the box provided.